E 477 
.8 
.U5 
Copy 1 




Hass E.-- 4 7 ? 
Book lLAJ 



Digitized by the Internet Archive 
in 2010 with funding from 
The< Library of Congress 



http://www.archive.org/details/reportofoperatio01unit 



REPORT OP OPERATIONS 

OF THE 

UNITED STATES FORCES, 

AND / / _' 

aENERAL INFORMATION 

OF THE 
IN THE 

Military Division of the South-West and Gulf 

AND 

i/y ' c^ - /'I T>v) M _ 

DEPARTMENT OF THE GULF. 
MAJOR GENERAL P.B. SHERIDAN, U. S. A., 



From May 29, 1865, to November 4, 1866. 



Z3 






n 



^ 



Headquakteks Depaetment of the Gulp, 
t New Orleans, Louisiana, November i:, 1866. 

Brevet Major General J. A. Rawlins, 

Chief of Staff, 

Washington, D. 0. 
Genebal : 

In compliance with your letter of instructions, dated Oc- 
tober 4, 1866, I have the honor to make the following report 
of operations within the limits of my command since the 29th 
of May, 1865: 

On the 17th of May, 1865, I was relieved from com- 
mand of the Middle Military Division, and assigned to the 
command of all the territory west of the Mississippi, and 
south of the Arkansas rivers, with directions ta report to Lieu- 
tenant General Grant for instructions. 

This territory embraced, at that time within its limits, 
the only organized rebel army left in the Confederacy, which 
was under the command of the rebel General E. Kirby Smith, 
with Headquarters at Shreveport, or vicinity, in the State of 
Louisiana. 

My instructions from the Lieutenant General were : to 
operate against this command; to break it up or destroy it. 
For this purpose I was authorized to draw from Major Gen- 
eral J". J. Reynolds, Commanding the Department of Arkan- 
sas, 12,000 men, and from Major General L. R. S. Canby, Com- 
manding Military Division of West Mississippi, 25,000 mt ; 
together with the 4th and 25th Army Corps, and a column oi 
from 8,000 to 9,000 cavahy to be collected from Louisiana, 
West Tennessee, Mississippi and Alabama. The aggregate 
strength of this force was about 80,000 men. 

On the 29th of May I assumed control of this new com- 
mand, designating it the Military Division of the South-West 
with Headquarters at New Orleans, Louisiana; and, at about 
the same time received intelligence of the surrender of E. 
Kirby Smith, through commissioners sent from him to Major 
General Canby. This surrender was made, but bore upon its 
face double-dealing on the part of the rebel commander, or 
his agents, as the Texas troops declined to surrender, and had ^^ 

disbanded to their homes, destroying their magazines, and car- 
rying with them arms and ammunition from the different ar- 



senals; General Smith proceeded to Galveston, and from thence 
escaped to Mexico, in violation of the agreement he had bound 
himself to observe. This conduct on his part may have arisen 
from the fact that his real object in offering to surrender was, 
to get security for the Arkansas, Louisiana and Missouri troops 
to return to their homes; knowing full well that the Texas 
troops did not intend to surrender, and that most of them had 
already gone to their homes, and that while they were destroy- 
ing their arsenals and carrying home with them their arms, it 
was their constant boast that they were not conquered and 
that they would renew the fight at some future day. 

Previous to the surrender, and in anticipation of the sue - 
cessful escape of Jefferson Davis, and his probable arrival in 
the Trans-Mississippi Department, it had been contemplated 
to organize a column of about 15,000 Confederates at Mar- 
shall, Texas, for the invasion of Mexico. This scheme failed, 
perhaps from the capture of Mr. Davis; but while the main 
scheme of sending the 15,000 men to Mexico failed, numerous 
bands, squads and parties, numbering perhaps 3,000 or 4,000 
men, crossed the Rio Grande into Mexico. 

In view of this and the troubles of our sister Republic, 
and taking into consideration the fact that all our military 
projects, during the war, against Texas had been failures, and 
that on this account the union people there had come to look 
upon the Government as weak; it was determined to throw a 
large force into that State and along the Rio Grande border. 
The accomplishment of this purpose was accompanied with 
great labor from various causes, but it was successfully achieved. 

Among the first difficulties were the inadequacy of the 
depot at this place for the requirements of the service to be 
accomplished, the absence of all mercantile marine, and the 
worthless character of most of the transportation held by the 
Quartermaster's Department here, for the purpose of crossing 
the Gulf, or entering the ports of Texas, the destruction of 
aU the wharves at the ports in Texas, with the exception of 
Galveston, by the Confederates, and the long line of commu- 
nications to the points occupied in the interior, over which 
supplies had to be sent; and last but not least, the great re- 
luctance of the troops — officers and men — to continue for a 
longer period in the service; they claiming that they had ful- 
filled their contract with the government, and that it was but 
just they should be mustered out. 

The movement of the 13th Corps had been ordered before 



I reached New Orleans. One division of it under Major Gen- 
eral F. J. Herron, proceeded to occupy the line of the Bed 
River in Louisiana, and Marshall and Jefferson in North-East- 
ern Texas; one division under Major General P. Steele, was 
under orders for the Rio Grande line; the 3d Division, under 
Major General J. A. Mower, was ordered to Galveston, from 
thence to occupy the line of railroad from Galveston to Bren- 
ham, while Major General Gordon Granger, who was in com- 
mand of the corps, was assigned to general command in Texas. 

While these movements of the 13th Corps were in pro- 
gress, I was rapidly collecting at Alexandria, Louisiana, a col- 
umn of cavalry about 4,500 strong, to be commanded by Ma- 
jor General G. A. Custer, and another column at Shreveport, 
Louisiana, about 5,000 strong, to be commanded by Major 
General Wesley Merritt. These cavalry columns were collected 
from different points in the States before mentioned, and were 
transported up Red River by steamboats, under great diffi- 
culties from the low stage of the water, and were organized 
into divisions, equipped, supplied, and prepared to march for 
their resi3ective points of destination. Merritt's Division to 
march via Marshall to San Antonio, and Custer's Division via 
Hempstead to Austin, Texas; the columns marching nearly 
parallel to each other and something like a hundred miles ai3art. 

These columns took with them a small pontoon train to 
cross streams on the line of march, and for the additional ob- 
ject of being able to cross the Rio Grande, should the gov- 
ernment elect to send troops in that direction. 

While the movements of the 13th Corps and cavah-y 
were going on, the 25th Corps was embarked at City Point, 
Va. , for the coast of Texas, to occupy the ijoints of Indiano- 
la. Corpus Christi, Brazos Santiago, and the line of the Rio 
Grande, most of the corps, however, being sent to the Rio 
Grande line. Great trouble was experienced in the landing 
of the troops of this corps, in consequence of the bad har- 
bors in Texas, the great draft of the vessels employed as 
transports, and the absence of suitable lighters to convey the 
troops across the bars. 

While the foregoing operations were in progress, the 4th 
Army Corps, numbering about 10,000 men, with all its field 
transportation arrived in New Orleans, having been ordered 
to report to me for service in Texas, and was transported as 
rai^idly as possible to Indianola, and from thence to Victoria, 
and ordered to occiipy the line from that point to San Antonio. 



V 



The troops on the line from Galveston to Austin were 
supplied with comparative ease, as the bar at Galveston of- 
fered no very difficult obstacle ; the wharves, although in bad 
condition, still sufficed ; the railroad to Hempstead and Bren- 
ham was in condition to transfer our necessary supj)lies, and 
from Brenham to Austin there was a passable wagon road. 

The landing of the troops at Indianola was difficult on 
account of the dangerous bar, which had to be lightered over 
from the transports, and in consequence of the destruction of 
the wharves, the lightering had to be, in most cases, to the 
shore in small boats. Then when- the troops were landed, 
there was no water for a distance of eighteen miles, and they, 
had to be hurried over this distance as soon as landed, and 
from thence to Victoria, where timber and v/ater could be ob- 
tained in abundance. Victoria is distant from Indianola about 
thirty-five or forty miles. 

After these difficulties had been overcome, it was found 
that the country between Indianola and Victoria was not pas- 
sable for wagons in the winter, and the railroad Irom Lavaca 
to Victoria had to be repaired at much labor and some ex- 
pense,*else the troops would have had to come back to their 
supplies at Lavaca and Indianola, where there was no water. 
I therefore ordered the railroad repaired, and after it was in 
running order sold it to the comj)any, covering the cost of re- 
pairs. The wharf at Indianola had -also to be built entire, 
and when completed, sold to cover the expenses incurred. 

But on account of these obstacles, and especially the diffi- 
culty of crossing the outer bar, which is about twenty miles 
from the landing, some of the transports had to return to 
New Orleans or the mouth of the Mississippi Eiver, for water 
for the troops and coal for the transports. 

At Brazos Santiago the wharf had been destroyed, and 
many of the same difficulties occurred here, and some of the 
transports had also to return to the mouth of the Mississippi 
Biver and New Orleans for suj)plics of coal and water. The 
troops on this line were extended up the Bio Grande ^s far as 
Laredo, and along this Frontier much the larger number of 
troops were placed. A wharf had to be built at Brazos, and 
at first the troops up the Bio Grande were supplied by small 
steamers, which we had sent to that river, but the difficulties 
of entrance at the mouth of the Bio Grande made this line 
very dangerous and precarious for the supply of the troops, 
as sometimes a transport could not cross the bar at the 



mouth of the river for nine or ten days. I therefore ordered 
the buildiDg of a railroad from Brazos to White Eanche, on 
the Rio Grande Eiver— a distance of eleven miles— and this 
gave security to the supply of the troops. This railroad was 
afterwards sold, at about forty thousand dollars ($40,000) over 
the actual expense of construction. 

All these difficulties in the movement of troops were 
overcome, and in a short period of time. 

The effect of this large movement of troops on the des- 
tiny of Imperialism in Mexico, has not been fully apjireciated 
by our people. It is, however, well known that while we were 
struggling for Eepublican existence against organized rebel- 
lion, and when nearly all the heads of the government in 
Europe (except Russia) wished, and did believe that Repub- 
licanism was not a success ; the Emperor of the Erench under- 
took this bold expedition to subvert the Republic of Mexico. 
There was no territorial question to be settled, and history 
will not excuse the attempted annihilation of a nation on the 
jjlea of non-payment of a million or two of debts due. There 
was no good excuse for the attempted violation of rights, and 
the history of Imperialism in Mexico is only the history of 
the buccaneer Morgan, on a more extended scale, who at one 
time cax^tured and held Panama, on the Isthmus, until he 
could hold it no longer. When this movement of our 
troops to Texas and the Rio Grande took place, we found the 
line of that river and aU Northern Mexico in the hands of 
Imperialism — a government which collected no taxes, had no 
civil organization, and supported its partizans, soldiers 
and civillians, by levying contributions on the poor inhabi- 
tants. But the appearance of our troops, and the knowledge 
that friends were on the border, went like electricity to the 
homes and hearts of the Mexican people. The rebels who-, 
had escaped from our country received no sympathy, and in 
less than a year, this hardy people, without money, without 
arms and munitions of war, and without supplies, have re- 
captured Matamoras, Camargo, Presidio de Rio Grande, Lam- 
pissas, Monterey, Saltillo, Monclora, Durango, Chihuahua, 
and in fact hold nearly all the country, X3utting the invaders 
on the defensive,and confining them to the Valley of Mexico, 
with a fair prospect of their speedy extermination. 

I have felt much interest in this event, because I have al- 
ways believed that the occupation of Mexico was a part of the 
rebellion, and knowing that the contest in our own country 
was for the vindication of' Republicanism;. I did not think 



that tliat vindication would be complete until Maximilian was 
compelled to leave. 

The cours3 taken by nearly every newspaper in the lately 
rebellious States was sympathy for Maximilian, and the senti-* 
ment of a large portion of the population was likewise ; and 
so determined was this on the part of thousands of adventur- 
ers, that the Cordova emigi'ation scheme was gotten up, 
which had for its object the formation of a Maximillian-Amer- 
ican party, comjDOsed of confederates entertaining antix)athy 
toward our government. Many of these having no means 
would have drifted into the army of Maximilian. I had to 
take strong grounds against this emigration, and filially broke 
it up, by refusing to permit emigrants to embark from the 
seax:)orts within the limits of my command. 

The effect of the presence of our troops in Texas and on 
the Rio Grande, as alluded to heretofore, on the destiny of 
Imperialism, was great. It had not a friend among the offi- 
cers or men from the highest to the lowest grade, and the ef- 
fect was dei^ressing in the extreme. So much so, that I am 
inclined to believe that had a demand been made for the with- 
drawal of the Imperial troop'^, on the ground that the inva- 
sion of Mexico was a part of the rebellion, it would have 
been granted, and the miseries of that country for the last 
year avoided. 

While the Imperial troops held the line of the Rio Grande 
the strictest neutrality was preserved. Since they were driv- 
en away, the same honorable neutrality has been preserved to- 
wards the Liberal government. 

The number of troops sent to Texas was about 52,000. 
Shortly after they had arrived and become samcwhat settled, 
orders came for the muster-out of about 47,000 of this force, 
and the muster-out was carried on gradually and in accord- 
ance with our ability to bring them back, so that the move- 
ment may be considered as equal to a continuous movement 
of over 90,000 men over the most difficult line of operations 
which we have in the country. I make these remarks because 
I was under the impression at one time, that the Quartermas- 
ter General did not fully understand the magnitude of the 
movement, or the natural obstacles in the way of its accom- 
plishment, and we had to struggle for six months without 
funds, on the plea that the Brazos railroad was constructed 
without authority, in consequence the public service was 



made to suffer by the denial of funds. I believe the Quar- 
termaster General was influenced in this act by the represen- 
tations of incompetent Inspectors sent out to make reports. 

The condition of civil affairs in Texas was anomalous, 
singular, and unsatisfactory. I found the Provisional Gov- 
ernor, backed by a small portion of the iDopulation, had Jor 
his standard of loyalty "Abhorrence for the Eebellion and 
glory in its defeat." While his successor, as actual Govern- 
or had for his standard of loyalty ' 'Pride in Eebellion ; that 
it was a righteous but lost cause, being overpowered by the 
Federal forces. " Both of these representatives of the civil law, 
entertaining opposite standards for the loyalty of their sub- 
jects, I was required to support, and did it to the best of my 
abilty, but it has been embarrassing in the extreme. 

Governor Hamilton, the Provisional Governor, was clam- 
orous for more troops, and in several communications to me 
asserted that the civil law could not be carried out ; that 
freedmen would be killed and Union men driven from the 
State without military support, which I gave whenever it 
was possible. Governor Thockmorton, the present Governor, 
wants all the troops moved from the settled portions of the 
State, asserting that the civil law was all right, that justice 
would be done to freedmen, Union men, and to our soldiers 
in the courts. But justice is not done. To give you an in- 
stance of this: two soldiers were shot at Brenham, Texas, 
about two months ago, they were unarmed and offered no 
provocation; the Grand Jury could find no bill against their 
would-be-assassins, but, found a bill against Brevet Major 
Smith, ITtli Infantr}^ for burglary, because he broke into the 
house of some citizen in his attempt to arrest those men. 

My own opinion is that the trial of a white man for the 
murder of a f reedman in Texas, would be a farce, and in mak- 
ing this statement, I make it because truth compels me, and 
for no other reason. 

During the last sis months Indian dei^redations have taken 
place on the remote frontier. Their extent is not defined as 
yet, but they are not very alarming, and I think the Govern- 
or has, to some extent, been influenced by exaggerated re- 
ports, gotten up in some instances, by frontier people, to get 
a market for their produce, and in other instances by army 
contractors to make money. 

I have ordered two regiments of cavalry to the frontier, 



s 

and placed a regiment of infantry at Austin, to be moved if 
necessary. 

It is strange that over a white man killed by Indians on 
an extensive frontier, the greatest excitement will take place ; 
but over the killing of many fieedmen in the settlements, 
nothing is done. I cannot help but see this, and I cannot 
help but tell it to my superiors, no matter how unpleasant it 
may be to the authorities of Texas. 

I will establish the frontier posts in Texas in the early 
spring. It was not done heretofore on account of having 
no available regular troops, and to have attempted it with vol- 
unteer troops, desirous of returning to their homes, would 
have involved an expense, which I did not like to put upon 
the Government. 

In Louisana, there was about as much, if not more anom- 
aly in civil affairs, than in Texas. 

Our depot was in New Orleans, which from its geograph- 
ical position, became the main de^Dot of the Gulf States, and 
in fact, the whole of the South-West. This place hail neces- 
sarily been the Headquarters of superior commanders, and as 
many of them appeared to have more ability in civil than in 
military affairs, they left the results of that ability, to be set- 
tled by myself and the subordinate officers of my command. 
Questions and claims, semi-military and semi-civil, of every 
possible phase, and so numerous and complicated, that after 
a fair examination, I think that it will require one officer and 
ten clerks for over twelve months, to brief and systematise 
what is yet left. 

The settlement of such of those claims as have already 
come up, has been a dead weight upon the legitimate milita- 
ry duties of my command. Then there was the accumulation 
at this place of material of war of every possible character, 
from ocean steamships, down to pickaxes and spades, the dis- 
position of which gave great labor, but by keeping steadily 
at work, and by the good judgment of subordinate command- 
ers and staff officers of the different bureaux, this depot is 
now reduced to the j^resent wants of the service. 

At the time of my arrival at New Orleans, as before al- 
luded to, the civil affairs were much' mixed up. Governor J. 
Madison Wells was legitimately holding the position of Gov- 
ernor, but a new election was to occur in the summer or fall, 
and although from the antecedents of the Governor, who 



9 

supported the Federal authority, I had reason to expect good 
judgment, still, either on account of the approaching election 
(in which he was a candidate for re-election] or because he 
thought it best, he was filhng a number of vacancies in offices 
throughout the State by returned Confederates. I did not 
know this, as it was none of my business, until I learned it 
by the constant appeals made to me by men who were turued 
out to give place to new comers, whom they did not think de- 
serving; and, I only speak of it now, because it led after- 
wards to bitterness and the shedding of blood in which the 
military were to some extent involved. 

The Governor was re-elected and the Legislature met, 
but it was found that the Governor had one will and the Leg- 
islature had another; each hated the other and trouble was 
sure to come. 

Not only was the Legislatui-e in antagonism Avitli the Gov- 
ernor, but all, or nearly all the subordinate civil authorities 
in the State were against Lim. Many of these he had him- 
self appointed. Then the Governor commenced making ap- 
peals to the military authorities to support him; and when it 
Avas proper and legitimate to serve the ends of justice, such 
support was given. But when it was to satisfy partizan or 
political purposes it was refused, and the military assumed 
the position that politics Avas outside of the profession, and 
that it could not be called upon legitimately, to serve the 
interests of either side. This bitter political feeling finally 
culminated in the massacre of the 30th Jnly, 1866. I have 
thought that had I been in the city this slaughter might have 
been avoided; but, I did not exi^ect it to occur, and was led to 
this belief by a conversation, about the 1st of June, held with 
Judge Durrell, who was the President of the Louisana Con- 
vention of 1861:, and who told me that he would decline to 
call it together. He asked if it could have military sup^Dort, 
I said it could not; that I would not allow the military to be 
used for party purposes; but that if the parties in the State 
came into collision, it would be my duty to maintain the j^eace 
of the country, in as much as I had believed for some time 
past that the safety of life and property did not rest with the 
civil authorities, when there was any great disturbing cause. 

In Florida there were no political issues involving the 
military authorities, although much annoyance occasionally 
came from arrests of officers and soldiers for acts allcmHl to 



10 V 

have been committed during the rebellion. The jjeople of 
Florida appeared to realize the fact that it would not make 
much difference to them what party was in j)ower, and that 
their best interest was to take off their coats and go to work 
to repair the disaster of the rebellion. 

On the 27th of June, 1865, the temi^orary Military Di- 
visioj] of the South -West was abolished by the creation of the 
Military Divison of the Gulf, which included the Dei3art- 
ment of Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi and Florida. These 
departments were respectively commanded by Major Gen- 
erals Wright, Canby, Slocum, and Foster. 

On October 7, 1865, the Dejaartment of Mississip^Di was 
transferred to the Military Division of the Tennessee. 

On May 22, 1866, Major General Canby having been or- 
dcxed to Washington, was succeeded by Brevet Major Gen- 
eral A. Baiidin the command of the Department of Louisiana. 
I am, Generfd, 

Very respectfully. 

Your obedient seu^ant, 



Major General U. S. A. 



\ 



m\ 



LIBRARY 



CONGRESS 




